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I study the relationship between political constraints and the probability of sovereign
default on external debt using a dynamic stochastic model of fiscal policy augmented
with legislative bargaining and default. I find that political constraints and default
probability are inversely related if the output cost of default is not too high. The
model government comprises legislators who bargain over policy instruments, including
over a local public good that benefits only the regions they represent. Higher political
constraints are equivalent to more legislators with veto power over fiscal policies. This
implies that during a default, the released resources need to be distributed among more
regions as local public goods, with a smaller benefit accruing to each region, discour-
aging default. However, if default is too costly, even governments with lower political
constraints default less frequently. Empirical evidence from South American countries
is consistent with this result. I calibrate the infinite horizon model to Argentina. It
confirms the negative relationship. A counterfactual exercise with even higher political
constraints shows that the default by Argentina in 2001 could not be avoided.
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Political constraints play an important role in determining the fiscal policies of the government,
including its decision to default on external debt. Conventional wisdom in this issue is divided.
Less constrained governments are more powerful and able to take unpopular austerity measures
whenever necessary. On the other hand, the same may be tempted to default and misuse available
resources whenever possible. For the latter case, more political constraints are seen as a source of
credibility by the international lenders. In this paper, I analyze the incentives for the sovereign to
default resulting from its interaction with several degrees of political constraints using a political-
economy model of fiscal policy (Battaglini and Coate (2008)), augmented by lack of commitment
to repay (Arellano (2008)).
In most sovereign countries, fiscal policies are enacted by legislation that requires consent from
the legislature. Voting requirements in various spheres of the government represent political con-
straints. In countries run by dictators, political constraints are absent. On the other hand, most
countries require majority or super-majority votes in the legislature to pass a policy. This process is
further complicated by group formation within the legislature supporting or opposing a bill. Thus,
even though a bill might require a simple majority to pass, governments effectively face constraints
that may be lower or higher than the majority requirement. In this paper, I consider an overall
measure of political constraints and focus on its interaction with fiscal policy and default1.
An example of a country with low political constraints is Venezuela. Even though the country
has a National assembly with elected representatives, the president of the country can bypass them
using his political clout. This claim is more appropriate for the regime of Hugo Chavez. On
the other hand, a country with high political constraints is Chile. Their administration has two
representative houses. The president does not have absolute control over the policies implemented.
In the data, political constraints are captured by the POLCONv index, created by Henisz (2000)2.
I find that it is negatively related to sovereign spreads, an indicator of the probability of default,
in a sample of South American countries with median immediate output loss3 in default lower
than the cross country median4. Figure 1 plots the relationship between POLCONv and country
spreads. The left panel represents the relationship for countries with low output loss in default for
the sample period between 1995 and 2018. The relationship is significantly negative. On the other
hand the right panel plots the same for countries with higher immediate output loss in default. It
1I do not elaborate on the microeconomic foundations of political constraints and use aggregate data and
the model to determine the implied level of political constraints.
2Or XCONST representing Executive Constraints from the POLITY IV database.
3Of course, the immediate output loss in default may not be the best proxy for the output cost of default.
The results in this paper go through anyway.
4Countries with low output loss in default are Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Mexico, Chile and Brazil.
Those with high costs are Ecuador, Mexico, Panama and Peru.
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Figure 1: Relationship between political constraints and country spreads
Note: Each point in the above figure represents a country-year observation. Each observation is
demeaned using the country mean for both POLCONv and spreads to avoid country-specific level
effects. The shaded area around the line of best fit represents the 95% confidence interval. The
data source for EMBIG spreads is J.P. Morgan Ltd.
shows no significant relationship, as is evident from the slope and standard deviation of the line of
best fit reported at the top right corner of the figure.5
In the model economy, legislators, each representing a region, bargain every period over a set
of policies. These include spending on a pure public good, distortionary taxes on labor income,
spending on region-specific (local) public goods, external borrowing, and default. Within a period,
for every round of bargaining, a proposer is picked randomly. His/her policy proposal must obtain
the support of a subset of legislators (minimum winning coalition, henceforth mwc) to be imple-
mented. An arrangement that requires the support of a bigger mwc represents a more constrained
government.
The government borrows from international risk-neutral lenders. They price the sovereign
bonds by taking into account the government’s ability to default on debt. The lenders discipline
the government borrowing by offering lower prices if the probability of a default is high. The lenders
thus also take into account the political constraints faced by the government.
The ability to provide local public goods by the government is key to understanding the rela-
tionship between political constraints and the probability of default. A less constrained government
levies taxes and borrows on behalf of the entire polity, but cares only about the consent of the mem-
bers of the mwc. Whenever possible, it needs to provide local public goods to the members of the
mwc. There are three main channels through which political constraints influence the probability
of default. First, a smaller mwc induces the government to borrow more. This is because the
borrowed resources are distributed as local public goods among fewer legislators. Lenders perceive
higher borrowing to be associated with a higher probability of future default and offer a lower
price on the debt. The lower prices increase the chances of current default. This channel is called
overborrowing.
5Please see the empirical section for a rigorous investigation of the above relationship.
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Second, for a given level of debt, default is more rewarding for the less constrained government
because the released resources are distributed as local public goods among fewer legislators. This
is the static channel. However, at the margin, if the debt burden is high enough, default may be
equally or more lucrative for the more constrained government because the marginal value of the
defaulted resources are high. This is true if the released resources are used to provide more valuable
pure public goods. This situation is possible only if the output loss in default is high enough so
that the government can sustain a high level of debt in the first place.
Finally, the dynamic channel affects the probability of default through the continuation value
of the government in the current period. Even if defaulting does not release resources to provide
for local public goods in the current period, current default incentives are affected by the static
channel in the future periods. Lenders price the current debt accordingly.
I solve an infinite horizon version of the model numerically for a Markov perfect equilibrium.
I calibrate the model to Argentina for a period leading up to 2001. I find that there is a negative
relationship between political constraints and spreads. The model prediction matches the data
reasonably well and predicts default in the same period as that in the data. In an event study
for the 2001 default episode for Argentina, I find that even a counter-factually higher degree of
political constraints for the same period could not have prevented the default.
In the model6, I find that fiscal policies are pro-cyclical. In periods of low productivity shock,
the international lenders demand higher yields on the debt. The government depends more on tax
financing and lowers public spending because it is more expensive to borrow.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature. Section
3 describes the economic environment, including the government policies and the political process.
Section 4 defines the political equilibrium. Section 5 partially characterizes the equilibrium and
discusses the mechanisms of the model. Section 6 describes the calibration and quantitative results.
Section 7 describes the counterfactual event study on Argentina. Section 8 discusses the data and
empirical results from a sample of South American countries. Section 9 concludes.
2 Related work
This paper connects the literature on the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy with that on sovereign
default and is related to the empirical literature on political constraints and its relationship with
country risk.
The tax smoothing model by Aiyagari et al. (2002) studies the fiscal policy behavior of the
government facing a stochastic shock on government spending and incomplete markets. In an
environment with incomplete markets, the government self insures by accumulating assets. In the
stationary equilibrium, the government no longer needs to borrow; it uses its assets to finance
spending. To generate realistic borrowing behavior, the authors used an ad-hoc upper bound on
6Similar to Cuadra et al. (2010).
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the level of assets accumulated by the government. Battaglini and Coate (2008) and Barseghyan
et al. (2013) introduced political frictions in the same tax smoothing environment. In their model,
policies are determined by legislative bargaining similar to the one proposed by Baron and Ferejohn
(1989). The legislative bargaining process generates endogenous lower bounds for taxes and upper
bounds for government spending. Azzimonti et al. (2016) use the same environment to study the
effect of balanced budget rules on fiscal policies. In this paper, I borrow the legislative bargaining
framework of Barseghyan et al. (2013) and introduce default. With both legislative bargaining and
limited commitment to repay debt, my model generates both an endogenous upper and lower bound
for all the fiscal policies. Using a similar environment, Cusato Novelli (2020) study the interaction
between political fragmentation and borrowing behavior. He explains how political myopia can
result in excessive borrowing and higher spreads but abstracts from other fiscal policies and the
impact of higher output costs on default behavior.
The literature addressing the cyclical behavior of fiscal policies finds and explains counter-
cyclical or acyclical fiscal policies for advanced economies. Empirical evidence from developed
countries suggests that even though fiscal policies are slightly pro-cyclical in developed countries,
they are much more so in the emerging markets. Gavin and Perotti (1997) note that financial
frictions, as opposed to political ones, are responsible for pro-cyclicality. More specifically, they note
that in recessions borrowing constraints are tighter, which leads to contractionary fiscal policies.
However, during booms, the borrowing constraints are relaxed, and the government depends less
on taxes for revenue. The literature on sovereign default also creates financial frictions yielding
pro-cyclical fiscal policies. Arellano (2008) uses the default environment in Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981) to show how default events are accompanied by interest rate spikes and deep recessions.
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) uses a similar environment to point out the effect of a stochastic trend
in explaining the behavior of macroeconomic aggregates in emerging market economies. Chatterjee
and Eyigungor (2012) uses a similar environment to study long term debt while Mihalache (2020)
proposes how defaults can be resolved through maturity extension. In my paper I use one-period
debt and focus mainly on the default incentives resulting from political frictions. Cuadra et al.
(2010) introduces government spending and fiscal policies in the same environment and shows that
default incentives generate financial frictions that generate pro-cyclical fiscal policies. However, the
literature on sovereign default mostly assumes a benevolent government, maximizing the welfare of
a representative agent. I deviate from this assumption and introduce political frictions. Political
turnover and its impact on default behavior have been studied in Cuadra and Sapriza (2008).
Hatchondo et al. (2009) models how turnover, specifically among heterogenous governments can
impact default. They focus on the future discount factor induced by political frictions. In my
paper, I focus on the politics of redistribution while keeping the effective discount factor constant.
Hatchondo and Martinez (2010) presents an excellent survey of the literature on the interaction of
politics and sovereign default.
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The broader idea of how political constraints affect fiscal behavior, in general, was introduced
by De Mesquita et al. (2005). The main idea of their book explains when is good politics bad policy
and vice versa. They show that if the executive power depends on a small coalition for support,
there is no incentive to work for the benefit of the entire electorate. In this paper, I study how
various coalition sizes, signifying various degrees of political constraints affect fiscal policies and also
the default behavior of the government. Here also the executive cares only about the supporting
coalition. The impact is clear on fiscal policies.
Eichler (2014) uses a data-set on twenty-three emerging market countries and finds that default
probabilities are unrelated to political constraints. However, among certain groups of countries,
he finds that the relation can be significant. He uses ICRG data for political constraints while I
use the POLCONv index by Henisz (2000) and XCONST from the POLITY IV database, and find
a significant negative effect among a particular group of countries. Saiegh (2009) compares the
default propensities of coalition ruled governments to single-party governments. He uses a sample
of 48 developing countries from 1971 to 1997 to find that coalitions governments default less. My
paper uses a broader definition of political constraints and introduces a positive theory of the
relationship between political constraints and default. Block and Vaaler (2004) study empirically
how the possibility of political turnover can impact default risk. Bussiere and Mulder (2000) find
that indicators of political uncertainty can magnify the possibility of a crisis. In my paper, the
probability of a turnover is constant. I control for political uncertainty due to turnover risk to find
effect of political constraints on the probability of sovereign default.
3 Economic Environment
In this section, first I describe the household behavior given government policies. Then, I describe
the government policies both in the state of repayment and default. Finally, I describe the legislative
and default protocol, including the timing of events within a given period.
3.1 Preferences and Production
Time is discrete. The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived agents living in n
uniformly populated regions, denoted by i = 1, 2, ..., n. The population in each district is normalized
to 1. There is a single non-storable consumption good denoted by x, produced using a single factor,
labor, denoted by l, and a linear technology x = zl. The citizens are endowed with 1 unit of labor
every period. There is a pure public good, denoted by g, produced from the consumption good
using a linear technology g = x and a region-specific local public good, si, for region i, produced
from the consumption good using a similar linear technology si = x. Agents consume x, supply
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labor for production, and enjoy both the pure public good and the local public good. They discount
the future at a rate β. Each citizen living in region i has a period utility function given by











g1−σ + si (1)
where σ > 0 is the risk-aversion parameter. The parameters γ > 0 and π > 0 capture the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply, and the relative importance of pure public goods relative to consumption
and leisure. The utility weight of the local public good si is normalized to 1.
The utility function is assumed to have a GHH specification (Greenwood et al. (1988)) in
consumption and labor, and additively separable in g and si. I further assume that the agent’s
preferences are quasi-linear in the local public good si. This assumption is innocuous. Its makes
the model numerically tractable and has no qualitative effect.
Labor productivity, z ∈ Z, varies randomly with some persistence. I assume that it follows a
first-order Markov process µ(z′|z), where µ(.) is the probability of realization of a specific value of
the productivity shock z′, given z.
Labor markets in the economy are competitive. Given the linear production technology for the
consumption good, the wage rate in the economy (w) fluctuates one-one with the labor productivity
shock z in equilibrium.
3.2 Government Policies
At the beginning of a period, the government finds itself either in good standing with the inter-
national capital markets, denoted by Ω = 1 or in default, denoted by Ω = 0. In good standing,
the government is free to access the international capital markets to borrow or save, by buying
or selling respectively, one-period non-contingent bonds. The resources raised by the government
from capital markets is denoted by −qb′ + b, where a positive value of b′ is the face value of the
current assets of the government, and a positive value of b, the face value of the last period’s assets.
q denotes the unit price of the new issuance.
In periods with good financial standing, the government supplements the resources raised by
borrowing with a proportional income tax, denoted by τ . The tax revenue and the borrowed funds
are used to finance pure public goods and region-specific local public goods. However, there is
limited commitment to repay the maturing debt, −b. If the government reneges on its current debt
obligations, it is immediately barred from participating in the international credit markets, and its
credit standing is downgraded to Ω = 0. This exclusion continues for a stochastic number of periods
determined by an exogenous parameter θ. The decision to default on its debt is denoted by the
indicator d′, that takes the value 1 if the government defaults, and 0 otherwise. If the government
decides to default, it only relies on tax revenues to finance both the pure and local public goods.
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Figure 2: Timeline of Events
The government starts a period with a realized productivity shock z, the current debt stock,
and knows whether it is eligible to participate in the international capital markets. The state of
the economy is summarized by Π = (z, b,Ω). If the government cannot borrow or lend (Ω=0), it
chooses the policies {τ, g, s1, s2, ..., sn}. In a period starting with no market access, d
′ is constrained
to be 1. On the other hand, in good standing, the government chooses whether to renege on its
debt obligations before choosing other policies. This is the Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) timing,
as depicted in Figure 2. If the government defaults, its debt obligations are reduced to zero and
it loses access to credit markets immediately. Therefore, its policy instruments available are the
same as those in default. If it chooses to repay, it maintains good standing and its policy choice
is described by the n + 3 tuple {τ, g, b′, s1, s2, ..., sn}. This timing protocol is different from that
in Cole and Kehoe (2000), where the government can issue new debt before the default decision in
the current period.
The citizens in the economy are not allowed to borrow or save. The government borrows or
saves on their behalf. Following Na (2015), this decision can be easily decentralized and the same
equilibrium can be implemented. Given the current government policies and the realization of
productivity shock, each citizen solves the following problem to determine his supply of labor.
















where (1−τ)zl is the disposable income of a citizen. It is easy to show that l∗(τ, z) = [z(1−τ)]
1
γ .
The government budget must satisfy two feasibility constraints. Firstly, revenues must cover the
expenditures. Assume that in the current period the productivity shock in z and the stock of ma-
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turing assets is b. Then, given the policy choice of the government, {τ, g, (1−d′)b′, d′, s1, s2, ..., sn}
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the government’s revenue is given by
nτzl∗(τ, z) = nτz[z(1− τ)]
1
γ (3)
Feasibility requires that the government’s net of local public goods provision surplus, denoted
by B(τ, g, b′, d′; Π) = nτzl∗(τ, z)− g+ (1− d′)[b− qb′] must be equal or exceed the total amount of
resources allocated for pure public good provision across all regions,
∑n
i=1 si.




Secondly, to rule out lump-sum taxes we further assume that si ≥ 0.
3.3 The Political Process
Government policies are decided by a legislative bargaining process. Representatives from n regions
bargain over the policy instruments {τ, g, b′, d′, s1, s2, ..., sn} in periods of good market standing and,
{τ, g, s1, s2, ..., sn} is periods of default. Since each region is populated by a uniform population,
the identity of the representative is insignificant. The legislature meets every period and takes up
only a negligible amount of time to decide on the policies.
Suppose the legislature meets at the beginning of a period with the current level of outstanding
assets equal to b and the productivity shock equal to z. One legislator, representing a particular
region is chosen at random to make the first proposal. A proposal is a set of feasible policies denoted
by {τ, g, d′, b′, s1, s2, ..., sn}, when Ω takes the value 1, and {τ, g, s1, s2, ..., sn}, when Ω takes the
value 0. The proposal requires m ≤ n votes to be implemented. If the proposal succeeds to obtain
the required number of votes, the policy is implemented and the legislature adjourns. It meets
again in the following period with a possibly different debt stock -b and a different realization of
the productivity shock z. If the proposal fails to obtain the required number of votes, the legislative
process moves to the next proposal round in which another legislator is chosen at random to propose.
If no agreement can be reached in T ≥ 2 proposal rounds, a legislator is appointed to choose a
reference policy. The reference policy is restricted to have the same allocation of local public goods
for every region.
4 Political Equilibrium
In this section, I describe the proposer’s optimization problem given households’ policy functions,
the problem of the foreign lenders, and then define the competitive equilibrium for this economy.
7This format for representing policies helps to describe repayment and default states together.
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4.1 The Proposer’s Problem
I focus attention on symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium. Though behavior in the current period
depends on the history of defaults, past behavior can be summarized by an additional state variable.
Similar to the Arellano (2008), past default behavior is summarized by Ω. Since the equilibrium is
symmetric, any proposer in round k ∈ {1, 2, ..., T} will choose the same policies.
In equilibrium, the proposer’s choice in round k and state Π is described by the policies




k=1, given that Ω takes the value 1 in the beginning of the current period
8.





Here τk denotes the proposed tax rate, gk denotes the proposed level of pure public goods, and
ski ∀i = 1, 2, ..., n denote the level of local public goods chosen by the proposer. Since the other
n − 1 legislators are ex-ante identical, the m − 1 coalition members whose consent is required to
pass the legislation are randomly chosen from them. The proposer obtains consent for his policy
by providing local public goods to the mwc. In equilibrium, the proposer does not provide local
public goods to the legislators outside the mwc, and by symmetry, provides each member an equal
amount of the same. The proposer’s region receives an allocation of local public goods of the value
B(τk, gk, b′k, d′k; Π)− (m− 1)sk if the period starts with good credit standing. Else, the allocation
is B(τk, gk; Π)− (m− 1)sk.












k=1 . If Ω = 1, the proposer
obtains a value V k0 . It is defined as





The proposer decides to default in proposal round k if the value it obtains in default, denoted
as V kd , is higher than the value if the proposer decides to repay, denoted by V
k
c . On the other
hand, in a period with Ω = 0, the value obtained by the proposer is V kn . The values in round T +1
represent the reference values if all proposal rounds fail. The value expected by the legislators
in round k + 1 if the economy is in good credit standing in the current period is given by Jk+10 ,
otherwise, the proposer expects Jk+1d . Expected values differ from the proposer’s current values
because the current proposer may not be chosen to propose in the following round. Thus, he
takes an expectation over his status in the legislature in round k+1 while formulating the current
proposal. Policies in round k+ 1 reflect the choices of a randomly chosen proposer in round k+ 1.
I focus on an equilibrium such that in any proposal round k, the proposal is accepted imme-
diately and the legislature dissolves. On the equilibrium path, proposal rounds 2, ..., T does not
occur. This reflects the assumption that any coalition member accepts a policy mix that ensures
that he is weakly better off than the value expected in the next round. The enters the current
8All the fiscal policies and value functions are functions of the state Π. It is suppressed for convenience
of notation
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proposer’s problem as an incentive compatibility constraint. His problem in proposal round k, if
the economy is in good credit standing and, he decides to repay is given by
V kc (Π) = max
{τ,g,s,b′}
U(c, l∗, g) +B(τ, g, b′; Π)− (m− 1)s+ βEz′J0(Π
′)
s.t. c = (1− τ)zl∗
U(c, l, g) + s+ βEz′J0(Π
′) ≥ Jk+10 (Π)
B(τ, g, b′; Π) ≥ (m− 1)s
s ≥ 0
(6)
In this problem, B(.) is defined as nτzl∗ − g + b − q(z, b′)b′. The government understands
that its demand for external funds can influence the bond prices offered by the lenders. The first
constraint of the problem (6) describes household behavior, given policies. The second constraint
is the incentive compatibility constraint for the members of the mwc. The third constraint ensures
the feasibility of government policies. Resources net of local public goods must be higher than the
resources diverted to provide the local public goods to the coalition members. Finally, as already
mentioned before, the level of local public goods provided to any region must be non-negative.
The expected future value in proposal round one in the following period is J0(Π
′). This takes into
account the fact that all equilibrium proposals are accepted in the first round. Superscript for
proposal round 1 is dropped for convenience.
If the economy is in good credit standing, and the proposer defaults, then the problem of the
proposer is as follows.
V kd (Π) = max
{τ,g,s}
U(c, l∗, g) +B(τ, g; Π)− (m− 1)s+ βEz′ [θJ0(Π
′) + (1− θ)Jd(Π
′)]
s.t. c = (1− τ)zl∗
U(c, l, g) + s+ βEz′ [θJ0(Π
′) + (1− θ)Jd(Π
′)] ≥ Jk+10 (Π)
B(τ, g; Π) ≥ (m− 1)s
s ≥ 0
(7)
After default, the government can gain access to the capital markets with probability θ. In
this contingency, the proposer expects J0 in the following period. However, with the remaining
probability, it stays in default and obtains value Jd. The default choice of the proposer, in round
k is given by
d′k(Π) =
{






If the economy is already in default, the default policy function, d′ is constrained to take the
value 1. The proposer’s problem, in this case, is given as
V kn (Π) = max
{τ,g,s}
U(c, l∗, g) +B(τ, g; Π)− (m− 1)s+ βEz′ [θJ0(Π
′) + (1− θ)Jd(Π
′)]
s.t. c = (1− τ)zl∗
U(c, l, g) + s+ βEz′ [θJ0(Π
′) + (1− θ)Jd(Π
′)] ≥ Jk+1d (Π)
B(τ, g; Π) ≥ (m− 1)s
s ≥ 0
(9)
The only difference between the problem of the proposer if he chooses to default, and if the
economy is already in default, is the expected value in round k + 1. This is because, in good
standing, the proposer in round k expects the future proposer to optimally choose the default
policy. However, on the equilibrium path, both the default problems are the same. By symmetry,
if the proposer in round k + 1 chooses to default, it is also optimal for the proposer in round k to
default.
The repayment set, Ψ(b), is defined as the set of productivity shocks z such that the proposer
chooses to repay.
Ψ(b) = {z ∈ Z : d′k(z, b) = 0} (10)
Similarly, the default set, Υ(b), is defined as the set of productivity shocks z such that the
proposer chooses default.
Υ(b) = {z ∈ Z : d′k(z, b) = 1} (11)
In equilibrium, given the future expected values, the proposer chooses policies consistent with
problems (6), (7) and (9). The future expected value functions are in turn determined by the
policies chosen by the proposer in the following period. In equilibrium, if the proposer in a given
period, with state Π, proposal round k, and Ω = 1, chooses policies {τ, g, s, b′, d′} then
Jk0 (Π) = U(c(τ
k, z), l∗, gk) +




if it is optimal to repay.




k, k), l∗, gk) +
B(τk, gk; Π)
n
+ βEz′(θJ0 + (1− θ)Jd(Π
′)) (13)
To understand the logic behind the above value functions, consider J0. In every proposal round,
the proposer is chosen with probability 1
n
. If the optimal policy in the current period is repayment,
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the proposer receives U(c(τ, z), l∗, g) + B(τ, g, b′; Π) − (m − 1)s + βEz′J0(Π
′). If the legislator is
not chosen to propose, but is part of the mwc, which happens with probability m−1
n
, he receives
U(c(τ, z), l∗, g) + s+ βEz′J0(Π
′). If the legislator is neither a proposer, nor part of the mwc, with
unconditional probability n−m
n
, he receives U(c(τ, z), l∗, g) + βEz′J0(Π
′). Taking expectation over
these three possibilities, we obtain J0(Π) in (12). The other expression is derived using the same
logic and default policy functions.
Finally, off the equilibrium path, if all the T proposal rounds fail, then the reference proposal
round is activated. The proposer is restricted to choose a policy such that the local public good
is distributed equally across all the n regions. If the proposer decides to repay in a state Π, with
Ω = 1, then his problem is
V T+1c (Π) = max
{τ,g,s,b′}
U(c, l∗, g) +




s.t. c = (1− τ)zl∗
B(τ, g, b′; Π) ≥ 0
(14)
Similar to the proposer’s problem is round k, the reference round proposer is also restricted
from accessing international capital markets in periods of no market access, that is Ω = 0, or when
the proposer decides to default in a period that starts with Ω = 1. The proposer’s problem in both
these default situations is given as
V T+1d (Π) = max
{τ,g,s}




′) + (1− θ)Jd(Π
′))
s.t. c = (1− τ)h(z)l∗
B(τ, g; Π) ≥ 0
(15)




There is an infinite number of identical, risk-neutral international lenders. These creditors have
the option to borrow and lend at a risk-free rate r from the international capital market. They can
also lend to the government of the small open economy in a perfectly competitive market.








The first term in the above equation denotes the resources the creditors lend to the government
in the current period. Since b′ denotes assets, the amount of bonds issued in the current period is
−b′. The price of each newly issued bond is q. In the following period, the government may default
on the accumulated debt with probability δ(z, b′) and, repays with probability 1− δ(z, b′).
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Since the lenders operate in a perfectly competitive market, profit maximization implies zero





The bond price schedule implies that the government is willing to lend any amount, given that
bond prices satisfy the zero-profit condition. The price mirrors the probability of default of the





Note that default probability is 0 if the default set Υ(b′) = ∅. In this situation, the government
can borrow at a risk-free rate. In case if the default set covers the full support of z ∈ Z, then the
probability of default in the following period is 1.
4.3 Productivity Cost of Default
Along with a market exclusion cost default is also assumed to affect aggregate productivity. The
rationale for this cost of defaulting is that default involves trade disruptions that hinder production
in the domestic economy, as explained by Rose (2005). Besides, sovereign bonds are held by domes-
tic banks before a default episode (Broner et al. (2014)). This can crowd out private investment
when the economy comes close to a default. Balance sheet effect on banks reduce lending activities
and are responsible for a loss in productivity. This transmission mechanism is explained in Bocola




z if d′ = 0
z −max{0, α0z + α1z
2}, α1 ≥ 0 if d
′ = 1
(19)
This cost function embeds several possible situations. If α0 = 0, and α1 > 0, then the cost of
default is proportional. If α1 > 0, and α0 = 0, then the cost rises more than proportionally to the
rise in productivity. If α0 < 0, and α1 > 0, then for z < −
α0
α1
, the default cost is 0, but the cost
rises more than proportionally for higher realizations of z. This concave cost of default is similar
to Arellano (2008), except, it allows for one more free parameter for the calibration. Mendoza and




A symmetric, competitive Markov-Perfect equilibrium for this economy is characterised by a set of
policy functions, {τk(Π), gk(Π), b′k(Π), sk(Π), d′k(Π)}T+1k=1 when Ω = 1, and {τ
k(Π), gk(Π), sk(Π)}T+1k=1












k=1 , default set Υ(b), repayment set
Ψ(b), the labor supply policy of the households l∗(z, τ) and the bond price schedule q(z, b′) such
that
1. Given fiscal policies, households solve their problem described in (2) to obtain the labor
supply policy function l∗(τ, z).
2. Given the household’s labor supply policy function, l∗(τ, z), the bond price schedule q(z, b′),




k=1 , the government solves for policy func-
tions, {τk(Π), gk(Π), b′k(Π), sk(Π), d′k(Π)}T+1k=1 in periods starting with Ω = 1,
and {τk(Π), gk(Π), sk(Π)}T+1k=1 in periods starting with Ω = 0 from the equations (6), (7), (9),














k=1 as described in (12) and (13).
4. The bond price schedule q(z, b′) must be consistent with the foreign creditor’s zero profit
condition (17) and, the repayment and default sets in (10) and (11) respectively.
5 Characterization and Mechanism
In this section, I partially characterize the equilibrium defined in the last section, and provide
intuitions for the main result of this paper: how does political constraints affect the probability of
default under different conditions.
5.1 Characterization
First, I present two propositions that make the computation of the equilibrium numerically tractable.
The first proposition shows that there exists a problem equivalent to the proposer’s problem in sec-
tion 4 that solves for the same policy functions as that of the proposer.
An equivalent problem that solves for the proposer’s policies in all the T proposal rounds, if
the proposer decides to repay is given as
Hc(Π) = max
{τ,g,b′}
U(c, l∗, g) +
B(τ, g, b′; z, b)
m
+ βEz′J0(Π)
s.t. c = (1− τ)zl∗(τ, z)
B(τ, g, b′; z, b) ≥ 0
(20)
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If the proposer defaults when it enters a period with Ω = 1, or is already in default, that is,
enters the period with Ω = 0, then, the equivalent problem is as follows.
Hd(Π) = max
{τ,g}




′) + (1− θ)Jd(Π
′))
s.t. c = (1− τ)zl∗(τ, z)
B(τ, g; z) ≥ 0
(21)
In periods with Ω = 1, the proposer defaults if Hd(Π) > Hc(Π).
Proof: See appendix.
The above equivalent problem states that the proposer’s optimization problem is as if he
distributes the surplus net of public good provision evenly across the members of the mwc.
5.1.1 Nature of Equilibrium Fiscal Policies
From Proposition 1, it is clear that the proposer effectively maximizes the utility of m coalition
members. If the economy is in good financial standing, the level of outstanding debt is not too
high and the realized productivity shock is not too low, the proposer provides the Samuelson level
of pure public goods, (π ∗ m)
1
σ . Any surplus in the government’s budget is used to provide local
public goods. This is because the marginal gain from providing local public goods is constant while
the gain from providing pure public goods is diminishing. However, if the level of outstanding
debt is high, the tax revenue and the borrowed resources are used for funding pure public goods.
The provision of local public goods in this situation requires higher taxes or lower pure public
good spending. Both these options are costlier compared to the gain from the local public good
provision. Thus, equilibrium fiscal policies for a given productivity shock, z, depend on a threshold
level of debt (−b∗), beyond which local public goods are not provided. For debt levels lower than
than the threshold, pure public good spending is constant and, local public goods are provided in
equilibrium.
However, the government may choose to default. In default, the government still maximizes the
joint utility ofm coalition members9. Fiscal policies in default are independent of the level of debt on
which the government defaults. For a high realization of the productivity shock, z, the government
may have enough tax revenue to provide the Samuelson level of pure public goods. The surplus
is used to provide local public goods. However, similar to repayment, if the productivity shock
is low, the marginal benefit of providing local public goods is much smaller compared to the cost
of increasing taxes or decreasing pure public goods provision. Thus, the nature of fiscal policies
in default depends on a threshold level of productivity shock z∗, beyond which the government
9I refer to the equivalent problem as the proposer’s problem from here on. However, the proposer does
not maximize the joint utility of m coalition members. It is only as if he does so.
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provides local public goods. As mentioned before, default policies are the same irrespective of
whether the proposer chooses to default or the economy is already in default.
5.2 Mechanism
There are three main channels through which political constraints (m) affect the probability of
default. First, governments run by smaller sized coalitions, (small m) tend to issue more debt.
Even though a higher debt level is associated with a lower price charged by international lenders,
the incentive to borrow more may dominate. This trade-off can be easily seen from the borrowing
decision of the proposer in periods of market access. If the government’s budget is not constrained,





+ β Ez′ J0(Π
′) (22)
A lower value of m implies a higher marginal benefit from borrowing today. However, the
marginal cost of borrowed resources is independent of m. This explains a greater incentive to
borrow for a smaller mwc. Intuitively, the borrowed resources are distributed as local public
goods to fewer members of the mwc. Each member is entitled to a bigger share. I call this the
Overborrowing channel. However, bond prices can discipline the incentive to borrow excessive
amounts. The disciplining effect of the bond prices on the incentive to borrow is a quantitative
question and will be discussed later.
Second, for any given level of debt, the incentive to default varies with the size of the mwc. This
incentive can be further broken down into two parts. The static channel creates incentives for the
proposer to default and provide local public goods to the coalition members in the current period.
The dynamic channel influences the current default decision through the continuation value of the
proposer even if no local public goods are paid out in the current period. It is the static channel at
work in the future periods, which in turn affects the current default decision through bond prices.
In what follows, I will use a one-period model to analytically characterize the static channel. The
dynamic channel will be explained in the quantitative section.
5.2.1 One-Period Model
In the one-period model environment, the government enters with market access, that is, Ω = 1,
and, inherits a debt stock −b. The productivity shock realized for the current period is z. For this
simple model consider a utility cost of default k. The government provides pure public goods, local
public goods, and imposes taxes on the citizens similar to the full model. The only restriction is
that the government cannot borrow10. Since Proposition 1 does not depend on the continuation
10No period follows the current period. Hence, no lender will lend to the government, neither will the
government want to save.
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values, it still holds. The following lemmas summarize the behavior of the fiscal policies in this
simple one-period economy.







= 0, if z ≤ z∗(m)
∂τ
∂z







> 0, if z ≤ z∗(m)
∂g
∂z







= 0, if z ≤ z∗(m)
∂B
∂z
> 0, if z > z∗(m)
4. z∗(m) is increasing in m.
Proof: See appendix.
Intuitively, if the government defaults, the current debt obligation becomes 0. Surplus net
of pure public goods is given as B(.) = nτzl∗ − g. For this model, we assume that there is no
productivity cost of default. If the government’s budget is not constrained, the first-order condition
for the pure public good provision yields g∗ = (π ∗m)
1
σ . I define z∗(m) as the value of z such that
nτz∗(m)l∗ = g∗.
If z < z∗(m), since the government’s tax revenue is increasing in z, the pure public good is
under-provided, that is, g < g∗(m). In this case, the marginal benefit from providing g is much
higher than that obtained from providing local public goods ( 1
m
). All the tax revenue is used to
provide g, and no local public goods are provided. This implies B = 0. A higher realization of z,
with z still less than z∗(m), increases the tax revenue and the provision of g. This explains the first
part of statements (2) and (3) of the lemma. Higher z, with z < z∗(m) reduces the marginal cost
of taxes, but also reduces the marginal gain from pure public goods. Thus, taxes do not respond
to z. This is caused by the same curvature in both g and the consumption-labor supply part of the
utility function.
If z > z∗(m), the government’s budget is unconstrained. In this situation, g equals g∗(m).
For even higher realizations of z, the marginal resources are diverted toward the provision of local
public goods. The marginal benefit from local public goods ( 1
m
) exceeds that from pure public
goods beyond g∗(m). This explains the last part of statements (2) and (3) of the lemma. For
higher realizations of z, with z > z∗(m), the marginal cost of a higher tax rate declines, but the
benefit is constant since the proceeds are used to pay for local public goods. Then, it is optimal to
increase tax rates. The proof of part 4 follows trivially from the lemma.








= 0, if b ≥ b∗(z,m)
∂τ
∂b







= 0, if b ≥ b∗(z,m)
∂g
∂b







> 0, if b ≥ b∗(z,m)
∂B
∂b
= 0, if b < b∗(z,m)
4. b∗(z,m) is increasing in m, decreasing in z, and the fiscal policies are independent of m if
b < b∗(z,m).
Proof: See appendix.
First, consider the net of public goods and debt payment surplus, denoted byB(.) = nτzl∗−g+b,
where −b is the debt stock outstanding in the current period. Given z, b∗(z,m) is defined implicitly
by the equation, nτzl∗− g∗(m)+ b∗(z,m) = 0. Here, g∗(m) is the maximum pure public goods the
government chooses to provide, (π ∗m)
1
σ .
For b ≥ b∗(z,m), the government’s assets are high and the budget is not constrained. In this
situation, tax rates are already at their lowest level and do not respond to a further increase in
assets11. Since the provision of pure public goods in this situation equals g∗(m), the higher savings
are used to finance local public goods, which gives a constant marginal utility ( 1
m
). Hence further
increase in the provision of g is not optimal. This explains the first part of statements (1), (2) and
(3) for lemma 2.
If b < b∗(m), the government’s budget is constrained. An additional unit of assets is now used
to reduce taxes and increase the provision of g. Local public goods are not provided, since, the
benefit from it is constant and lower than reducing taxes and increasing the provision of pure public
goods. This explains the second part of statements (1), (2) and (3). (4) follows trivially from the
definition of b∗(z,m).
In what follows, I compare two economies, one with m = m1, and the other with m = m2,
and m1 > m2. I assume that both the governments in the current period have market access,
that is, Ω = 1, both the economies experience the same productivity shock z and have the same
level of outstanding debt. The objective is to show how the default incentives differ across these
governments.
5.2.2 Case 1
Let (z, b) be such that z > z∗(m1) > z
∗(m2), and, both b
∗(m1)
12 and b∗(m2) are high enough such
that the government’s budget are not constrained both in repayment and default.
11Even lower taxes to absorb the increase in assets does not justify the utility gain.
12b∗(z,m)= b∗(m) for a given z. I drop z to reduce the burden of notation.
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Figure 3: Case 1
Figure 3 plots the gain from default for the two economies characterized by different mwcs.
Since the government’s budget in both the economies is unconstrained, the governments in both
economies use the resources released from default to provide local public goods. None of the policies,
except for local public good provision differ between the economies. Thus, the gain in both the
economies can be denoted by − b
mi
− k, ∀i = 1, 2. The government with a lower mwc has a higher
default incentive, and hence sustains a lower level of debt. The government with m = m1 can
sustain −b1 debt, while the government with m = m2 can sustain −b2 debt before it defaults.
5.2.3 Case 2
Let (z, b) be such that z > z∗(m1) > z
∗(m2), but b
∗(m1) is small enough to constrain the budget
of the government with m = m1
13. The assets for the government with m = m2 is the same as
in Case 1. In this case, both the governments provide local public goods in default, but only the
government with m = m2 provides local public goods in repayment.
Figure 4 plots the gains from default for these two economies. For m = m2, the gains are linear,
the same as in Case 1. However, for m = m1 the government’s budget is constrained if the debt
level rises above −b1(m1). For debt levels lower than −b
∗(m1), gains are linear since the marginal
benefit from the defaultable resources is constant. For higher levels of debt, the marginal value
of resources released by default is higher than 1
m1
, and increases with higher levels of debt. This
13Follows from Lemma 2.
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Figure 4: Case 2
explains the convex rise in gains from default for the government with m = m2. Still, the higher
mwc government sustains a higher level of debt before it defaults (−b1).
For the same state as in Case 2, if default is costlier, k′ > k, then gains from default are
described in Figure 5. A higher cost of default, k′, prevents default for both the governments
before they accumulate a much higher stock of debt. However, the bigger mwc enjoys more gains
from defaulting at higher debt stocks, since its budget is constrained and has a higher marginal
value of resources. Higher gains from default can induce the m = m1 government to default at a
much lower level of debt. This is an example of a situation where a higher cost of default makes
bigger coalitions default more frequently than smaller ones.
5.2.4 Case 3
Consider the case where z is such that z∗(m1) > z
∗(m2) > z. In this case, local public goods are
not provided in default, as is evident from lemma 1. In the one-period model environment, this also
implies that there is no local public good provision in repayment. This implies that (from Lemma
2), b∗(m1) and b
∗(m2) are both bigger than 0. It follows that the fiscal policies in both repayment
and default are the same for both the economies. In this situation, the gains from default can
be summarized by Figure 6. Since all the fiscal policies are the same, the gains from default for
both the governments coincide in this case. Both the governments can sustain the same debt stock
−b1 = b2.
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Figure 5: Costlier Default
Figure 6: Case 3
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Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Target Description
σ 2 CRRA
γ 0.5 Frisch Elasticity
r 0.01 90 day U.S. Treasury
θ 0.038 6.5 Years of Exclusion
ρ 0.949 Detrended Real GDP
}
AR(1)
σǫ 0.023 Volatility of Real GDP







m 31 Immediate GDP Drop = -0.08
α0 -0.746 E(Spreads) = 8.15%




Note that the one-period model only informs about the static incentives of default induced by
the political constraints, for a given level of debt stock. The dynamic channel is explained later in
the quantitative section.
6 Quantitative Results
This section summarizes the calibration technique and the quantitative results. First, I describe
the calibration technique used. Then, I use the model simulations to explain the dynamic channel
described before and perform comparative static exercises by changing the parameter of interest,
m.
6.1 Calibration
I calibrate the model to Argentina for the period 1992 Q2 to 2001 Q4. This is the run-up to the
2001 default episode. I use quarterly data on real GDP, consumption, and trade balance (TB) as
a share of GDP from Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012). The data on government spending is at
an annual frequency and is retrieved from the World Bank website. For tax rates, I use annual
Government Revenue (without grants) as a percentage of GDP from the World Bank. The series
on real consumption, real GDP, real government spending, and government revenue are seasonally
adjusted, logged and linearly detrended.
Table 1 reports the calibrated parameters and their respective targets in the data. A period
is one quarter. The risk aversion parameter in the utility function σ is set to 2, as is common in
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the literature. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply γ is set to 0.5. This is a conservative choice,
given the wide range of values for labor supply elasticity found in the literature. The exogenous
productivity shock is assumed to follow an AR(1) process of the form
zt+1 = (1− ρ)µ+ ρzt + ǫt+1 (23)




ǫ . The income process parameters ρ and σǫ are chosen by
fitting the above AR(1) process to the detrended real GDP series given the elasticity of labor
supply. The fitted AR(1) process is discretized to 201 possible realizations of the productivity
shock using Tauchen and Hussey (1991). I use 100 equally spaced grid points for the borrowing
level ranging from 0 to 200 percent of average GDP in the model.
The probability of re-entry into the market following default, θ is set to 0.0385, following
Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012). This is approximately equal to 1
θ
∼= 26 quarters (6.5 years) of
exclusion from the financial markets after a default event. Gelos et al. (2011) use microdata on
the time a sovereign spends between default and resumption of market access. On average, they
find the period to be 4.7 years long. Richmond and Dias (2009) and Cruces and Trebesch (2013)
also estimate the time spent in exclusion by a country after default. As opposed to Gelos et al.
(2011), they calculate the period of exclusion as the time between the official end of default and
the resumption of market participation. After adjusting for the average time spent by a country in
default, the average estimate of these studies is 13.1 years of exclusion. Our estimate is conservative
and lies between these two. Also, the model results are little sensitive to the exclusion parameter,
hence our assumption is robust to other choices of θ.
The risk-free interest rate r is set to 1 percent. It is matched to the 3-month U.S. Treasury bill
interest rate for the period under consideration. The discount factor β is calibrated to match the
debt-service to GDP ratio. α0 is calibrated to match the immediate loss in output during default.
This is calculated as the average difference in output between the period before default and three
consecutive periods into default, if the default lasts for more than or equal to three periods. α1
is calibrated to match the standard deviation of annualized spreads for the period between 1992
Q2 to 2001 Q4. m is calibrated to match the mean of annualized spreads in the same period.
π is calibrated to match the ratio of government spending to GDP in the data. n is set to 100.
m, β, α0, α1 and π are jointly calibrated by minimizing a quadratic loss function. The model
is simulated for the endogenous allocations, consumption, GDP, TB as a share of GDP, spreads,
taxes, government spending, and transfers for one million model periods. The values of the initial
and final five thousand periods are discarded. Then, the moments for debt service ratio, the mean
and standard deviation of spreads, and the government spending to output ratio are computed for
forty model periods, conditional on no default, and leading up to a default event in the forty-first
period. These moments are matched to those in the data to pin down the parameter values.
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σ(GDP ) 0.072 0.068
ρ(r − r∗, GDP ) -0.79 -0.17
ρ( TB
GDP
, GDP ) -0.88 -0.45
ρ(GDP, c) 0.98 0.92
ρ(GDP, g) 0.67 0.88
ρ(GDP, tax) -0.21 -0.33
E(r − r∗) 8.15% 7.69%







Output Loss 8.0% 6.5%
6.2 Benchmark Results: Pro-Cyclicality of Fiscal Policies
Table 2 reports the results from the benchmark calibration. The first column lists the moments
of interest. The second column is the data counterpart of the model generated moments and, the
third column lists the moments generated from the benchmark model.
The moments targeted in the calibration are listed below the horizontal line in the table. The
calibration matches E(r − r∗), σ(Spreads), gGDP and
b
GDP reasonably well. However, it misses the
median output loss in default by more than one percentage point. Using debt-service to GDP ratio
in place of the debt-to-GDP ratio is usual in a model with short term debt.
The correlation coefficients between GDP and taxes and, GDP and TB are negative. The cor-
relation between GDP and pure public goods spending is positive. This reflects the pro-cyclicality
of fiscal policies in the model. This is common in emerging market economies. The correlation
coefficient between GDP and spreads in the model is negative and matches the data.
The allocation of local public goods is also pro-cyclical14. It is easy to see the intuition from
the one-period model in Section 5. Following Lemma 2, a high z, for a given asset level b implies
that the government’s budget is not constrained. In the full model, when the government is allowed
to borrow, counter-cyclical spreads create incentives to borrow in good times. This increases the
14I do not have data on local public goods. There is no unique way of decomposing government spending
into pure and local public good spending. Furthermore, data on the separate heads under which government
resources are allocated are not easily available.
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Figure 7: Simulated Local Public Goods
surplus in the government’s budget, which is used to finance local public goods. However, in times
with low z, the international lenders charge higher interest rates anticipating a higher chance of
future default. The lower shock itself decreases the tax revenue. This leaves little room for surplus
revenues to be distributed as local public goods from the government’s budget.
Figure 7 plots a simulated series for pure public good provision for forty model periods, con-
ditional on no default. The solid (blue) line plots the GDP and, the dot-dashed (red) line plots
the series of local public goods. The plot confirms the pro-cyclicality of the local public goods.
Figure 8 plots the local public goods policy function of the government for three realizations of the
productivity shock. The plot shows that, for any given level of debt, local public good provision is
highest in periods with higher z.
Figure 9 plots the interest rates faced by government for the debt issued in the current period,
for three values of the productivity shock. The outermost line represents the highest shock. If the
government receives a high shock in the current period, the international lenders expect the shock
to persist, and are willing to lend a greater amount of resources at the risk-free rate compared to
the lower shocks in the figure. However, for lower realizations of the current productivity shock,
interest rates rise fast even for lower new debt issuance.
6.3 Effect of Political Constraints on Default Incentives
I change the parameter m to the lower value of 20 and the higher than benchmark value of 75 to
study the effect of political constraints in this model.
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Figure 8: Local Public Goods Policy
Figure 9: Interest Rate Schedule
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Table 3: Comparing Fiscal Policies Across Political Constraints




σ(c) 0.086 0.086 0.053
σ(GDP) 0.068 0.070 0.064
ρ(r − r∗,GDP) -0.17 -0.37 -0.08
ρ( TB
GDP
,GDP) -0.45 -0.49 -0.17
ρ(GDP, c) 0.92 0.96 0.91
ρ(GDP, g) 0.88 0.94 0.76
ρ(GDP, tax) -0.33 -0.49 0.47
E(r − r∗) 7.69% 4.33% 48.1%







Output Drop 6.5% 6.5% 4.9%
Table 4: Default Probabilities Across Political Constraints (Costlier Default)
Moment m=31 m=75 m=20
E(r − r∗) 9.03% 9.63% 6.59%
σ(r − r∗) 1.39% 1.44% 9.43%
In what follows, first, I discuss the differences in cyclical properties of the fiscal policies resulting
from changes in the political constraints. Then, I discuss the dynamic channel of default incentives
and, the Overborrowing channel, using the quantitative results.
The differences in the cyclical properties of the fiscal policies are reported in Table 3. It also
reproduces the benchmark model results for convenience. The first column reports the cyclical
properties of the benchmark model, while the second and third columns report the business cycle
properties for the case with m = 75, and m = 20 respectively. The main takeaway from this table is
that the spreads in the calibrated model are negatively related to political constraints. In the model
with m = 75, the average value of spreads is 4.33 percentage points, a little more than half of that
reported in the benchmark. On the other hand, in the model with m = 20, spreads are close to 48
percentage points. The volatility of the spreads s also affected by the political constraints. Spreads
are more volatile in the model with lower political constraints but decrease with the increase in the
degree of political constraints.
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Among the other fiscal policies, the debt to GDP ratio is highest in the benchmark. Even
though spreads are lower in the m = 75 model, the government borrows less. However, for the
model with m = 20, the urge of the government to over-borrow is disciplined by the international
lenders who offer lower prices. Since the probability of default is high for the least constrained
government, external borrowing is severely restricted, making the fluctuation of the Trade Balance
less correlated with GDP.
Government spending to GDP is least for the model withm = 20, and highest for the model with
m = 75. Finally, taxes are counter-cyclical for the less constrained government. Since borrowing
is heavily disciplined by the lenders, borrowed funds cannot replace the tax revenue even in good
times. Countercyclical taxes are also responsible for lower fluctuation in consumption and GDP.
Table 4 reports the country spreads and its standard deviations across different values of political
constraints in the baseline model if default is arbitrarily costlier in terms of productivity. The value
of α1 is -606 with all the other parameter values constant
15. This is exactly opposite to the baseline
result. Higher degree of political constraints are associated with higher spreads. Intuitively, for the
lower m government the entire cost of defaulting is borne by fewer coalition members in terms of
lower allocation of local public goods, either in the current period or in future periods of default.
This creates repayment incentives for the proposer in more states. However, for the government
with a higher m, individual share of the extra cost is negligible. It does not change incentives much.
To see how the overborrowing channel works, consider Figure 10. It plots the borrowing policy
function for a government withm = 75, and that of a government withm = 31, both with the about
the average realization of the productivity shock. The government’s budget is not constrained for
low levels of debt for the m = 31 government. The borrowing level, in this case, is higher than the
government with unanimity. Since the debt level is low, the less constrained government prefers to
overborrow and redistribute the proceeds as local public goods. However, for higher levels of debt,
the lenders’ disciplining effect dominates and makes debt costlier. This is evident from Table 3 .
Finally, consider the dynamic channel. For this purpose, it is best to consider two coalition
sizes such that none of them can provide local public good in default in the current period16. Since
overborrowing involves movement along the bond price schedule, and the dynamic channel involves
a shift of the bold price schedule, we can easily isolate dynamic channel from overborrowing.
Figure 11 plots the local public goods policy functions for a government with m = 31, and a
government with m = 75, for the same productivity shock as in Figure 10. Even though the low
m government can provide local public goods to the coalition members at a low level of debt, the
high m cannot provide local public goods at all. It is also clear from Figure 11 that none of the
governments provide local public goods in default and they default at different levels of debt.
15The appendix shows a plot of the default cost function with a higher cost relative to the baseline. The
result holds for any value of the parameter that implies a higher productivity cost of default.
16This helps in separating the effect of the static channel from the dynamic channel.
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Figure 10: Borrowing Policy Function
Figure 11: Local Public Goods Policy
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Figure 12: Interest Rate Schedules for Different Degrees of Political Constraints
Figure 12 shows the interest rate schedules for the above two governments, for the average the
same shock. For low levels of debt, both governments can borrow risk-free. However, for higher
levels of debt, the smaller sized coalition pays a higher interest on the newly issued debt, compared
to the bigger one. Why is this the case if there is no Overborrowing or static incentive present?
In a one-period model, a constrained government budget with no local public good provision
for both the ms would imply the same fiscal policies, given that the debt level is the same. But, in
the infinite horizon model, the continuation values of the proposers in the two models are different.
For the government with lower m, the chances of facing an unconstrained budget, accompanied by
local public good spending are higher than the government with higher m. As explained in Section
5, this creates a higher incentive to default in the following period. The lenders anticipate this
incentive and price in this additional risk. Lower prices on the newly issued debt in the current
period makes the proposer in the m = 31 government default at a lower stock of debt.
In the following section, I use this model to conduct a counterfactual event study for the 2001
default event in Argentina.
7 Event Study: Argentina 2001
Argentina defaulted on its external debt in the last quarter of 2001. The value of the defaulted debt
was $88 billion and the country continued to stay in default status for the next four years. In this
section, I compare the ten years leading up to the default episode in the data to that predicted by
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the calibrated model. I run a counterfactual experiment with a higher degree of political constraints
to see if such an arrangement could have prevented the default. I also compare the other endogenous
variables in the benchmark with those in the counterfactual model.
First I find the series of productivity shocks to match the model GDP and the detrended GDP in
the data. Then, given the productivity shock in the initial period, I find the amount of outstanding
debt such that spreads in the initial period in the model match that in the data. The remaining
series for the debt level is generated endogenously, using the policy functions from the benchmark
model. Using the series for productivity shocks and the level of debt for the entire period under
consideration, other endogenous variables are determined using the corresponding policy functions.
Figure 13 plots the simulated time paths of all the endogenous variables for the period under
consideration. In Panel (a), the solid (blue) line is the real GDP series generated by the model,
the dashed (red) line is the data. During the default event in 2001, the cyclical component of
GDP shows a sharp decline. Since the state variables of the model are matched to mirror the
exact behavior, the model predicted GDP behaves exactly in the same way as the data. Panel (b)
plots the model and data series for spreads. The solid (blue) line is the model prediction, while
the dashed (red) line is the data. The model prediction matches the data reasonably well. Most
importantly, the model economy defaults in exactly the same period where the data indicates a
default. This is reflected by explosive spreads in the last period. The model economy does not
default in any period other than the last one.
Panels (c) and (d) plot the simulated series for the pure and local public goods in the model
economy respectively. Pure public good provision is pro-cyclical as is evident from the solid blue
line in panel (c) and local public goods are not provided in any situation. This implies that the
government budget is constrained. Panels (e) and (f) plot the tax rates and the simulated paths of
labor supply respectively. Panels (g) and (h) plot the new borrowing and the level of consumption.
Labor supply and consumption respond to the pro-cyclical government policies.
Had Argentina had a higher degree of political constraints, could it prevent the default in 2001?
To answer this question, I use the same sequence of productivity shocks as in the benchmark event
study and the same initial debt level. Keeping all the other parameters constant, I increase the
political constraints parameter m to its maximum value in the calibration. The productivity shock
sequence and the initial debt level are used to find out the remaining debt series. The state variables
are then used to compute the counterfactual path for all other endogenous variables.
Counterfactual real GDP is represented by the dot-dashed (yellow) line in panel (a) of Figure
13. The spreads are also lower for the counterfactual model (yellow line in panel (b)). This result
shows that for the benchmark calibration, a higher degree of political constraints is associated
with lower country risk and hence, lower spreads. However, the counterfactual model also shows a
default at the same time as the benchmark model, and the data shows a default. Thus, even though
the default risk is lower in the counterfactual environment, a huge negative productivity shock in
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(a) GDP (b) Spreads
(c) Pure Public Good (d) Local Public Good
(e) Tax Rates (f) Labor Supply
(g) Debt Level (h) Consumption
Figure 13: Endogenous Variables prior to 2001 Argentina Default
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the last period forces the government to default. This shows that higher political constraints in
Argentina could not have prevented the default.
The dot-dashed (red) lines in panels (c) to (h) show the series for all other endogenous variables
in the counterfactual environment. Except for new borrowing and spreads all other variables behave
in a similar way as the baseline. In the counterfactual model borrowing is lower in periods of high
productivity shock. This shows that the overborrowing channel is partially responsible for higher
spreads in the baseline.
The event study is also an example of the effect of the dynamic channel. Observe that, in the
period before default (period 39), both the benchmark and the counterfactual governments’ budgets
are constrained, as evident from no local public good provision, and the new debt issuance is also
the same (as seen in panel(g)). In a one-period world, the fiscal policies of both governments will
be exactly similar. In the full model, the more constrained government is less exposed to default
risk. International investors pay a higher price for their sovereign bonds.
8 Empirical Evidence
This section summarizes the evidence on the relationship between political constraints and the
probability of sovereign default conditional on the output costs associated with default. First I
describe the data and summarize the variables used. Then I describe the econometric model based
on the above theory and summarize the results.
8.1 Data
I construct a dataset comprising ten South American countries, the Dominican Republic, Mexico,
Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, and Panama. The sample time
period for the panel is 1995 to 2016. The panel is unbalanced with time period ranging from 10 to
22 years. I use the dataset used by Trebesch and Zabel (2017) to obtain the periods of default and
the associated output cost for this set of countries. Since their dataset ranges from 1980-2010, it
provides a longer window with more default and debt crisis episodes17. I focus on South America
for my empirical analysis mainly because many of these countries defaulted on their sovereign debt
in the past few decades, and hence their spreads and fiscal policy behavior reflect significant default
risk. I use only those variables in the regression analysis which are relevant to the above theory.
Of course, there can me many more factors that impact default risk. Please refer to Eichler (2014)
for a discussion. The variables I use in this empirical study are as follows.
Spreadsit: Country spreads reflect among other things the probability of a country defaulting
on its external sovereign debt. A high spread means higher premium on the interest rate on foreign
debt of a country over the benchmark U.S. Treasury bond, considered risk free. According to the
17However, I drop Colombia from our data because their last default episode was in 1935
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main result in the theoretical part of the paper, higher political constraints are be associated with
lower spreads for countries with low output cost of default.
POLCONvit: As an empirical measure for political constraints, I use POLCONvit by Henisz
(2000). A higher POLCONvit score means a more constrained government. This variable ranges
drom 0 to 1 with 1 meaning the highest degree of executive constraints. According to the calibrated
model, a high POLCONvit implies lower Spreads for countries with low cost of default.
XCONSTit: This is used as an alternative to POLCONvit. It comes from the POLITY IV
database and also captures the degree of executive constraints. This variable ranges from 1 to 7
with 1 meaning unlimited executive authority. Similarly, the theory predicts a negative relationship
between Spreadsit and XCONSTit for countries with low cost of sovereign default.
Low Costi: This is an indicator variable that takes a value 1 if the country has low cost of
default and 0 otherwise. It is assumed to be fixed for a country, and captures the resilience of a
country to recover from episodes of debt crisis. The cost associated with default for a country is
determined by the drop in growth rates of per-capita output from the pre-default/debt crisis period
to the period when the default or debt crisis starts18. I compute the median of all such episodes
for each country from 1980 to 2010. All the countries with median drop in growth rates above the
cross-country median are considered to have low cost of default. Others are considered to be ones
with high cost19.
(DebtGDP)it−1 : It is well established in the literature on sovereign default that a higher existing
debt to GDP ratio can increase the probability of default. This is because a high (DebtGDP)it−1 means
a higher payment burden on the government and stress on the government budget. This implies
higher spreads.
Growth Rateit: A higher growth rate of nominal GDP implies a higher productivity shock. In
these periods, the revenue received by the government is expected to increase. Higher receipts
reduce budgetary stress and create an incentive to repay. This is equivalent to the productivity
shock in the theory. A higher growth rate should be associated with lower spreads, implying lower
probability of default.
18I use default and debt crisis interchangeably even though they may be different in a narrower sense of
term.
19The results are also consistent with other classifications of the output cost of default. Other methods
considered are (a) median growth rates for all the default/debt crisis episodes for each country. (b) average
difference in growth rates from that of two periods prior to default and three consecutive periods into the
default. Note that, as opposed to the measure used in the main text, both these measures additionally
capture the growth rates during a protracted default episode as well.
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8.2 Model and Results
8.2.1 Econometric Model
I estimate the following models using standard fixed effects regression.
Spreadsit = β0 + β1 ∗ Constraintsit ∗ Low Costi +B.Xit + C.Yeart + αi + uit (24)
Equation (24) is the econometric model used to test the relationship between political con-
straints and the probability of sovereign default. Constraintsit represents both XCONSTit and
POLCONvit and are used in two different specifications. Xit represents the control variables rele-
vant to the model. Y eart is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for a particular year and 0
otherwise. αi and uit represent the random error terms. αi is the country-specific unobserved fixed
effects. The coefficient of interest is β1. It is a difference-in-differences estimator and measures the
difference in the effect of political constraints on country risk between low and high default cost
countries. Since I use a fixed effects specification, the variability of Constraintsit is used to identify
β1.
8.2.2 Results
Table 5 presents the regression results associated with equation (24). Column (1) and (2) report
the difference-in-differences estimates using POLCONvit as a measure of political constraints. In
column (1) the coefficient of interest is -15.352. The value is significant at 1% level. One standard
deviation increase in POLCONvit reduces the spreads by 3.37 percentage points, compared to that
in high default cost countries. In column (2) I control for the current GDP growth rate, outstanding
debt to GDP ratio, and the crisis dummy variable. In years of a debt crisis, country spreads are
6.7 percentage points higher. One standard deviation increase in the lagged debt to GDP ratio
increases country spreads by 0.87 percentage points and, a one percentage point increase in the
GDP growth rate reduces country spreads by 1.05 percentage points. All these results are consistent
with the literature. The coefficient of interest in column (2) does not change much compared to
that in (1). A one standard deviation increase in POLCONvit reduces spreads by 2.9 percentage
points.
Columns (3) and (4) reports the results of a similar exercise with XCONSTit as the measure of
political constraints. The coefficient of interest is not significantly different from 0 in column (3).
However, in column (4), after controlling for the relevant variables, it is significant at 5 percent
level. A one standard deviation increase in XCONSTit decreases country spreads by 2.64 percentage
points compared to countries with high cost of default. The magnitude is similar to that obtained
in columns (1) and (2). Furthermore, the magnitude and signs associated with the other control
variables also match those in columns (1) and(2).
36
Table 5: Fixed effects regressions with time effects, heteroskedasticity robust
Dependent variable:
spreads
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
POLCONv 1.955 0.283
(1.525) (1.398)








Low Cost* ̂POLCONv −48.456∗∗
(20.654)







Growth Rate −0.261∗∗ −0.277∗∗ −0.277∗∗
(0.116) (0.111) (0.111)
Observations 207 194 207 194 194
R2 0.259 0.457 0.204 0.458 0.458
Adjusted R2 0.112 0.333 0.047 0.334 0.334
Country FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
Note: Data on Spreads and executive constraints are winsorized to remove outliers. ∗∗∗
implies statistical significance at 1% percent level. ∗∗ and ∗ implies statistical significance
at 5% and 10% level respectively. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in
the parenthesis.
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Column (5) reports the results of an instrumental variables regression where XCONSTit is used
as an instrument for POLCONvit. ̂POLCONvit
20 is the predicted value of POLCONvit from the
first stage of the 2-SLS regression. Since the two measures of political constraints are computed
in two different ways21, this process eliminates measurement errors associated with each of them.
The difference-in-differences estimate is -48.456 and it is significant at a 5% level. One standard
deviation increase in the predicted value of POLCONvit reduces spreads by 2.03 percentage points
compared to that in countries with high cost of default. The effect of other control variables are
similar in magnitude and sign as in columns (2) and (4).
9 Conclusion
This paper studies the relationship between political constraints and the probability of external
sovereign debt default. Political constraints affect the default decision through the provision of a
region-specific, excludable local public goods. Defaulting on the currently maturing debt is more
beneficial for the less constrained government, as it releases resources to be distributed among fewer
mwc members as local public goods, compared to the more constrained government. This is the
static channel of default. Even if local public goods cannot be provided in the current period, less
constrained governments are more likely to provide for local public goods in the future. The risk-
neutral lenders anticipate this risk and charge higher interest rates on newly issued debt. This is the
dynamic channel influencing default in the current period. Finally, the less constrained government
finds it more beneficial to borrow more, simply because the resources are distributed among fewer
legislators. Higher borrowing implies lower prices on the debt. This is the Overborrowing channel.
The Overborrowing channel is responsible for movement along the bond price schedule, whereas,
the static and the dynamic channels cause the bond price schedule to shift inwards for the less
constrained government.
Finally, I also find that if the marginal value of the defaulted resources is very high, the less
constrained government can sustain higher debt levels. This is the case if the productivity cost of
default is too high. In this case, static and dynamic channel results overturn, while overborrowing
still makes the more constrained government to default less frequently. The model is calibrated
to Argentina and generates a negative relationship between political constraints and spreads. I
also find the same relationship in a sample of South American countries. The business cycle
statistics generated from the benchmark model are in line with the existing default literature. A
counterfactual experiment on the Argentine default event of 2001 is conducted using higher political
constraints. Results show that even the maximum degree of political constraints could not have
prevented the default.
20Subscripts it are suppressed in Table 5 for convenience.
21Refer to Henisz (2000) and the POLITY IV database for details.
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state-contingent debt. Journal of Political Economy, 110(6):1220–1254, 2002.
Alberto Alesina and Allan Drazen. Why are stabilizations delayed? Technical report, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1989.
Cristina Arellano. Default risk and income fluctuations in emerging economies. American Economic
Review, 98(3):690–712, 2008.
Marina Azzimonti, Marco Battaglini, and Stephen Coate. The costs and benefits of balanced budget
rules: Lessons from a political economy model of fiscal policy. Journal of Public Economics, 136:
45–61, 2016.
David P Baron and John A Ferejohn. Bargaining in legislatures. American political science review,
83(4):1181–1206, 1989.
Levon Barseghyan, Marco Battaglini, and Stephen Coate. Fiscal policy over the real business cycle:
A positive theory. Journal of Economic Theory, 148(6):2223–2265, 2013.
Marco Battaglini and Stephen Coate. A dynamic theory of public spending, taxation, and debt.
American Economic Review, 98(1):201–36, 2008.
Steven A Block and Paul M Vaaler. The price of democracy: sovereign risk ratings, bond spreads
and political business cycles in developing countries. Journal of International Money and Fi-
nance, 23(6):917–946, 2004.
Luigi Bocola. The pass-through of sovereign risk. Journal of Political Economy, 124(4):879–926,
2016.
Fernando Broner, Aitor Erce, Alberto Martin, and Jaume Ventura. Sovereign debt markets in tur-
bulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects. Journal of Monetary Economics,
61:114–142, 2014.
Matthieu Bussiere and Christian Mulder. Political instability and economic vulnerability. Interna-
tional Journal of Finance & Economics, 5(4):309–330, 2000.
Satyajit Chatterjee and Burcu Eyigungor. Maturity, indebtedness, and default risk. American
Economic Review, 102(6):2674–99, 2012.
39
Harold L Cole and Timothy J Kehoe. Self-fulfilling debt crises. The Review of Economic Studies,
67(1):91–116, 2000.
Juan J Cruces and Christoph Trebesch. Sovereign defaults: The price of haircuts. American
economic Journal: macroeconomics, 5(3):85–117, 2013.
Gabriel Cuadra and Horacio Sapriza. Sovereign default, interest rates and political uncertainty in
emerging markets. Journal of international Economics, 76(1):78–88, 2008.
Gabriel Cuadra, Juan M Sanchez, and Horacio Sapriza. Fiscal policy and default risk in emerging
markets. Review of Economic Dynamics, 13(2):452–469, 2010.
Antonio Cusato Novelli. Sovereign default, political instability and political fragmentation. Review
of International Economics, 2020.
Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, Alastair Smith, James D Morrow, and Randolph M Siverson. The logic
of political survival. MIT press, 2005.
Jonathan Eaton and Mark Gersovitz. Debt with potential repudiation: Theoretical and empirical
analysis. The Review of Economic Studies, 48(2):289–309, 1981.
Stefan Eichler. The political determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads. Journal of International
Money and Finance, 46:82–103, 2014.
Michael Gavin and Roberto Perotti. Fiscal policy in latin america. NBER macroeconomics annual,
12:11–61, 1997.
R Gaston Gelos, Ratna Sahay, and Guido Sandleris. Sovereign borrowing by developing countries:
What determines market access? Journal of international Economics, 83(2):243–254, 2011.
Jeremy Greenwood, Zvi Hercowitz, and Gregory W Huffman. Investment, capacity utilization, and
the real business cycle. The American Economic Review, pages 402–417, 1988.
Juan Carlos Hatchondo and Leonardo Martinez. Long-duration bonds and sovereign defaults.
Journal of international Economics, 79(1):117–125, 2009.
Juan Carlos Hatchondo and Leonardo Martinez. The politics of sovereign defaults. FRB Richmond
Economic Quarterly, 96(3):291–317, 2010.
Juan Carlos Hatchondo, Leonardo Martinez, and Horacio Sapriza. Heterogeneous borrowers in
quantitative models of sovereign default. International Economic Review, 50(4):1129–1151, 2009.
Juan Carlos Hatchondo, Leonardo Martinez, and Horacio Sapriza. Quantitative properties of
sovereign default models: solution methods matter. Review of Economic dynamics, 13(4):919–
933, 2010.
40
Witold J Henisz. The institutional environment for economic growth. Economics & Politics, 12
(1):1–31, 2000.
Sandra Valentina Lizarazo. Default risk and risk averse international investors. Journal of Inter-
national Economics, 89(2):317–330, 2013.
Guido Lorenzoni and Ivan Werning. Slow moving debt crises. American Economic Review, 109(9):
3229–63, 2019.
Enrique G Mendoza and Vivian Z Yue. A general equilibrium model of sovereign default and
business cycles. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(2):889–946, 2012.
Gabriel Mihalache. Sovereign default resolution through maturity extension. Journal of Interna-
tional Economics, page 103326, 2020.
Seunghoon Na. Business cycles and labor income shares in emerging economies. Available at SSRN
2810604, 2015.
Douglass C North and Barry R Weingast. Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institu-
tions governing public choice in seventeenth-century england. The journal of economic history,
49(4):803–832, 1989.
Christine Richmond and Daniel A Dias. Duration of capital market exclusion: An empirical inves-
tigation. Available at SSRN 1027844, 2009.
Andrew K Rose. One reason countries pay their debts: renegotiation and international trade.
Journal of development economics, 77(1):189–206, 2005.
Sebastian M Saiegh. Coalition governments and sovereign debt crises. Economics & Politics, 21
(2):232–254, 2009.
George Tauchen and Robert Hussey. Quadrature-based methods for obtaining approximate so-
lutions to nonlinear asset pricing models. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society,
pages 371–396, 1991.
Aaron Tornell and Philip R Lane. The voracity effect. American economic review, 89(1):22–46,
1999.
Christoph Trebesch and Michael Zabel. The output costs of hard and soft sovereign default.
European Economic Review, 92:416–432, 2017.




Figure 14: Relationship between Executive Constraints (XCONST) and country spreads
42
Figure 15: Productivity Costs of Default
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B Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is similar to Battaglini and Coate (2008). I show that the proposer effectively maximizes
the joint utility of m coalition members who vote in favour of his policies. The main assumption
behind this result is that utility is transferable across legislators in the form of local public goods.
In what follows, I provide the proof for the problem of the proposer if he decides to repay in a given
period. The one where he decides to default, or enters a period already in default are similar.
Proof. Let us start with proposal round T . The proposer’s problem if he repays in a period with
state Π is given as
V Tc (Π) = max
{τ,g,s,b′}
U(c, l∗, g) +B(τ, g, b′; Π)− (m− 1)s+ βEz′J0(Π
′)
s.t. c = (1− τ)zl∗
U(c, l∗, g) + s+ βEz′J0(Π
′) ≥ JT+10 (Π)
B(τ, l∗, g) ≥ (m− 1)s
s ≥ 0
(B.1)
If {τT , gT , b
′
T , sT } solves the above proposer’s problem, then I prove that {τT , gT , b
′
T } solves the
equivalent problem as mentioned in the main text.
HTc (Π) = max
{τ,g,b′}
U(c, l∗, g) +




s.t. c = (1− τ)zl∗
B(τ, l∗, g) ≥ 0
(B.2)
Furthermore, the local public good provision to the coalition members is given as sT = J
T+1
0 (Π)−
U(c, l∗, g)− βEz′J0(Π
′).




m[U(c, l∗, g) + +βEz′J0(Π
′)] +B(τ, g, b′; Π)
s.t. c = (1− τ)zl∗
B(τ, l∗, g) ≥ 0
(B.3)
First, it is easy to verify from the proposer’s problem that sT = J
T+1
0 (Π) − U(c, l
∗, g) −
βEz′J0(Π
′). Otherwise, from the definition of JT+10 it must be the case that sT > 0. In this
case the proposer can easily find a better allocation by optimally reducing sT . Eliminating s from
the proposer’s problem, the proposer’s payoff can be written as
m[U(c, l∗, g) + βEz′J0(Π
′)] +B(τ, g, b′; Π)− (m− 1)JT+10 (Π) (B.4)
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It is important to note that since the proposer cannot control the policies in the next proposal
round, he takes JT+10 (Π) as given. Hence the optimal choice of the tuple {τ, g, b
′} are independent
of the proposal round {1, 2, ..., T}. Only the local public good provision to the coalition members,
s depends on the proposal round.
Assume that {τT , gT , b
′
T } does not solve the equivalent problem. Let the allocations {τx, gx, b
′
x}






Here cx = c(τx, z), and l
∗
x = l
∗(z, τx). By construction, the incentive compatibility constraint of
the coalition members is satisfied. From the definition of JT+10 , sx ≥ 0. Finally, we need to verify
if B(τx, gx, b
′
x; Π)− (m− 1)sx ≥ 0. Eliminating sx from this expression yields
B(τx, gx, b
′
x; Π)− (m− 1)sx = (m− 1)[U(cx, l
∗









x, gx) + βEz′J0(Π
′)] +B(τx, gx, b
′
x; Π)
− (m− 1)JT+10 (Π)− J
T+1
0 (Π) + sx ≥ 0 (B.5)
The last inequality follows from the fact that {τx, gx, b
′
x} maximizes the equivalent problem
summarized by the first two terms on the left hand size of the inequality, the definition of JT+10
and sx ≥ 0. Thus the policy tuple {τx, gx, b
′
x, sx} is feasible and provides a better payoff to the
proposer. This is a contradiction.
Consider proposal round T −1. The proposer’s problem in this round when he decides to repay
is
V T−1c (Π) = max
{τ,g,s,b′}
U(c, l∗, g) +B(τ, g, b′; Π)− (m− 1)s+ βEz′J0(Π
′)
s.t. c = (1− τ)zl∗
U(c, l∗, g) + s+ βEz′J0(Π
′) ≥ JT0 (Π)
B(τ, l∗, g) ≥ (m− 1)s
s ≥ 0
(B.6)
The main difference between round T and round T − 1 is the expected value of the coalition
member in case the round T−1 negotiations fail. Notice that the value JT+10 is determined by max-
imizing the unanimous joint utility of the legislators. I need to show that if {τT−1, gT−1, b
′
T−1, sT−1}
solve the proposer’s problem in round T − 1, then {τT−1, gT−1, b
′
T−1} solves the equivalent problem
and sT−1 = J
T
0 − U(c, l
∗, g)− βEz′J0(Π
′).




′), then the proof for the rest of the rounds
{1, 2, ..., T −1} follows easily from the previous argument. To prove by contradiction, let us assume




′). Therefore, it must be the case that sT−1 = 0. Otherwise,
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if sT−1 ≥ 0, the proposer can obtain a better allocation by reducing the transfer of local public
goods sT−1. This implies




where cT = c(τT−1, z) and l
∗
T−1 = l
∗(τT−1, z). Thus, we can rewrite the proposer’s original





U(c, l∗, g) +B(τ, g, b′; Π) + βEz′J0(Π
′)
B(τ, g, b′; Π) ≥ 0
(B.8)








}. This proposal satisfies all the constraints of the
proposer’s problem in round T −1. The incentive compatibility constraint holds with equality. The
payoff of the proposer with these policies is
m[U(cT , l
∗
T , gT ) + βEz′J0(Π
′)] +B(τT , gT , b
′
T ; Π)− (m− 1)J
T
0 (Π) (B.9)
where cT = c(τT , z) and l
∗
T = l
∗(τT , z). This policy is strictly larger than
m[U(cT , l
∗
T , gT ) + βEz′J0(Π
′)] +B(τT , gT , b
′
T ; Π)




On the other hand, the optimal payoff of the proposer in proposal round T − 1 is
U(cT−1, l
∗
T−1, gT−1) +B(τT−1, gT−1, b
′
T−1; Π) + βEz′J0(Π
′) (B.11)
Therefore, the following inequality must hold.
U(cT−1, l
∗
T−1, gT−1) +B(τT−1, gT−1, b
′




T , gT ) + βEz′J0(Π
′)] +B(τT , gT , b
′
T ; Π)




This further implies that
m[U(cT−1, l
∗
T−1, gT−1) + βEz′J0(Π





T , gT ) + βEz′J0(Π




But this is impossible since {τT , gT , b
′
T } maximizes the equivalent problem given the value
expected by the coalition members in the following period.
The same logic can be applied for the other proposal rounds as well as for the proposer’s problem
in default.
C Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 characterizes the behavior of the one-period model when the government decides to
default or enters the period already in default. According to the timing of events in the model, in
both these situations, b=b′=0 in the event of default.
Proof. Incorporating the equilibrium form of labor supply into the objective function, the period













In default, the government maximizes the above period utility function. Since this is a one-
period problem, there is no continuation value for the government. Therefore, the government






s.t. B(τ, g; Π) ≥ 0
(C.2)
B(.) ≥ 0 is the government’s resource constraint. It says that the total pure public good
provided by the government in the current period cannot exceed tax revenues.





The left hand side is the marginal benefit from an additional unit of pure public good spending.
The corresponding cost is one less unit of local public goods spent out of the budget surplus. Notice
that I use the equivalent problem proved in Proposition 1 as the government’s problem. Clearly,
when the resource constraint is slack, the government provides g∗ = m−
1
σ pure public goods. Any
additional unit provided after g∗ is costlier for the government. Additional surplus is transferred
to the regions as local public goods.

















This is the same period utility function as before, except g is replaced by nτz[(1 − τ)z]
1
γ ,




















(−z)] = 0 (C.5)
The first term of the above expression is the cost of increasing labor income taxes by 1 unit,
assuming that the resource constraint binds. The second and the third terms are the benefit from
providing pure public goods. In the margin, the cost and benefit from raising taxes must be equal.
Also note that the entire additional tax revenue is use to provide pure public goods in this case.
The benefit from providing pure public goods g is bigger than 1
m
, the benefit from providing local
public goods.



















[...]] = 0 (C.6)
The z’s cancel out. This proves that τ = τ∗ if the resource constraint binds. Intuitively,when
the government is in default and the constraint binds, a higher z impacts the cost and benefit of
taxation equally. More specifically, a higher z implies a lower cost of taxation and a lower benefit
from using the entire tax revenue as pure public goods.
Thus, when the government’s budget is constrained,









> 0. g continues to rise with z until g = g∗.
The first order condition for the proposer’s problem with respect to τ , assuming that the

















































It can be easily verified that the above expression has a positive sign. Also, note that ∂τ
∂z
increases with m.
For the behavior of the government surplus, B(.), in default, if the government’s budget is
unconstrained, pure public good provision g = g∗. However, tax rates and tax revenues are both
increasing in z, as ∂τ
∂z
≥ 0 and the government operates on the positively sloped part of the Laffer
curve. Therefore, in this situation, the surplus is used to provide local public goods, and the




If the government’s budget is not constrained, the marginal benefit from providing pure public
goods, g is higher then 1
m
. Hence local public good provision is 0.
This far, I have characterized the behavior of the government is two situations, if the govern-
ment’s budget constraint is satisfied with a slack or binds. This is an endogenous outcome. Now I
find the condition which determine when the constraint binds.
Define z∗(m) such that
nτ∗z∗(m)
1+γ
γ [(1− τ∗)] = g∗(m) (C.11)
If follows from above that if z > z∗(m), the constraint binds, else it is satisfied at the optimum
with a slack. Furthermore, since g∗(m) = m−
1
σ , g∗(m) is increasing in m. This implies that z∗(m)
is increasing in m.
D Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2 summarizes the behavior of the one-period model when the government decides to repay
its existing debt, −b. We continue with our assumption of of equal utility weights on pure public
good spending and the consumption-leisure part of the utility function. Since this is a one-period
model, the government cannot borrow or save. Hence, b′ = 0.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we incorporate the equilibrium labor supply into the





















subject to the constraint B(τ, g; Π) ≥ 0, where B(τ, g; Π) = nτz[(1− τ)z]
1
γ − g + b.
Start with the pure public spending. If the government’s resource constraint is slack, then the
first order condition yields g−σ = 1
m
. Thus, when the resource constraint is slack, the amount
of pure public good provision is g∗ = m−
1
σ . Beyond this point, it is optimal for the government
to provide local public goods instead of pure public goods. Hence, higher assets (b) keeps g∗
unchanged.
When the government’s resource constraint is slack, then first order conditions with respect to




When the government’s budget constraint binds, then we can write pure public good spending
as g = nτz[(1 − τ)z]
1
γ + b, that is, the entire tax revenue net of debt payment is used to provide















γ + b]1−σ (D.3)



















Marginal Revenue from Taxation
= 0
(D.4)
The first term on the left hand side is the cost of raising the tax rate by 1 unit while, the second
term is the benefit. Since the government’s budget is constrained, the entire tax revenue is used
to pay for the pay for the maturing debt stock and pure public goods. The benefit from taxation
accrues only to additional pure public good provision. Totally differentiating the above expression
with respect to b, and using the first order condition of taxation (positive marginal revenue from
taxation), I can show that ∂τ
∂b
≤ 0. Intuitively, higher assets reduce the marginal value of pure
public good provision. It is then optimal for the government to reduce distortionary taxes in the
margin.
When the government’s budget is constrained, provision of pure public goods equal g = nτz[(1−
τ)z]
1
γ + b. Re-writing the objective function above at the optimum, with given z, and taxes τ













γ + b]1−σ (D.5)




[Marginal Gain from Reduced Taxes−
Marginal Gain from Pure Public Goods] = 0 (D.6)
Since we already know that ∂τ
∂b
≤ 0, it must be the case that the gain from reduced taxes equals




Finally, when the government’s budget constraint binds, B(.)=0, by definition. In this situation,
when b increases for a given z, the tax rate is reduced and pure public good provision increases (as





= 0. However, if the government’s budget constraint is slack, then taxes and
pure public good provision are fixed (as already proved). The entire increase in assets is used to
provide local public goods. Thus, ∂B
∂b
≥ 0.
Define a b∗(z,m) such that nτ∗∗z[(1 − τ∗∗)z]
1
γ + b∗(z,m) = g∗(m)22, where b∗(z,m) is the
threshold value of government assets for which the government’s budget constraint binds. Since
g∗(m) is increasing in m, it is easy to follow that for a given value of z, b∗(z,m) is also increasing
in m. Keeping m constant, if z increases, tax revenue increases. For the above equation to hold,
b∗(z,m) must fall. Therefore, the asset threshold b∗(z,m) is decreasing in z.
22Assuming continuity
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